Notes

1/ See Appendix 3, The Structure and Location of the Forces Involved in the Battle and Siege of Sarajevo (Order of Battle); Appendices 6-9.

2/ The publication, Breakdown in the Balkans, A Chronicle of Events, January 1989 to May 1993, a Carnegie Endowment Special Publication compiled by Samantha Powers, utilizes reports from the Economist, Facts on File, Foreign Affairs, the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, the International Herald Tribune, Keesing's Record of World Events, the Los Angeles Times, the New York Times, Radio Free Europe/Radio Free Liberty Daily Report, the US Department of State Dispatch, and the Washington Post. This chronology was updated by the IHRLI staff.

3/ Linden Productions has provided IHRLI and the Commission of Experts with volunteer services in creating a computerized videotape database archive, allowing all video footage to be stored in a digital format on CD-ROM.

4/ This analysis is contained in the Appendices.

5/ See Appendix 1, Sarajevo Targets of Shelling with Accompanying Key.

6/ See Appendix 4, List of Most Frequently Hit Targets With Dates of Shelling Recorded in the Chronology of the Battle and Siege of Sarajevo.

7/ See Appendix 3, Table of Frequency of Shelling in Sarajevo Areas. This table provides a monthly breakdown of the shelling activity in each of the areas designated in the city and is based upon reports contained in the chronology.

8/ See Appendix 6, Photographs Picturing Targets Shelled in Sarajevo. These photographs were submitted by the BiH War Crimes Commission and other sources. In addition to including photographs of shelled targets, this Appendix contains listings of reported shelling dates for the targets which frequently appear in the chronology. Background summary descriptions are also provided for some of the targets pictured.

9/ A team of statisticians from the DePaul University Department of Mathematical Sciences, under the supervision of Dr. Effat Moussa, Director of Graduate Program Applied Mathematics, and graduate student Diane Horstman, helped analyse the statistical information in the chronology.

10/ See Appendix 2, Table of Total Daily Shelling Activity Reported.

11/ See Appendix 2, Daily Casualty Totals Reported: Number Killed. This table includes only those reports in the chronology which document the daily total number of persons killed. Numbers of reported killed in individual incidents are not included.

12/ See Appendix 3, Table of Daily Casualty Totals Reported: Number of Wounded. This table includes only reports in the chronology which document the total number of persons wounded. Numbers of reported wounded from individual incidents are not included.

13/ See Appendix 2, Graph of Reported Shelling Activity and Casualties by Day. This graph presents the information contained in Appendix 2, Total Daily Shelling Activity Reported, Appendix 2, Daily Casualty Totals Reported: Number Killed, and Appendix 3, Daily Casualty Totals Reported: Number Wounded. By combining the daily shelling and casualty reports in a graph form, it is meant to present the most complete picture of the events in Sarajevo during
Notes (continued)

the siege. See also, Appendix 2, Graph of Reported Shelling Activity and Casualties by Week. This graph is a weekly breakdown of Appendix 2, Reported Shelling Activity and Casualties by Day.

14/ See Appendix 2, Graph of Sarajevo Shelling and Casualties: Relationship to Political Events. This graph contains the same information as Appendix 2, Reported Shelling Activity and Casualties by Day, but also charts significant political events contained in the chronology.

15/ For an analysis on the link between shelling activity and political events, see paragraphs 42-43 below.

16/ See Appendix 1 for maps of Sarajevo. The first map is a detailed city plan. The second and third maps illustrate the Sarajevo's topography and the areas surrounding the city.

17/ Sarajevo was a cosmopolitan city sharing many characteristics with other major European cities. The surrounding areas are, however, generally inhabited by a rugged, mountain-rural population. There are, therefore, significant social differences between the city's defenders and the besiegers.

18/ See Appendix 2, Weekly Casualties Source: BiH Institute for Public Health. The casualty reports contained in this table are based on Institute for Public Health Bulletins beginning on 26 June 1992 and ending on 27 September 1993. Any inconsistencies which appear in the data reported by the Institute for Public Health are noted. For example the Bulletins reviewed initially reported victims as "killed", but subsequently listed victims under a broader category: "killed, died of undernourishment, cold and missing". As a result, the table lists this category as "killed or missing" and the sudden increase in numbers from 2,349 to 7,468 on 9 November 1992, reflects the change in the Institute for Public Health's methodology. Similarly, on 16 August 1992, there is a sudden increase in the total number of wounded from 9,446 to 22,677. This increase is due to the fact that the Institute for Public Health then began reporting both severely and lightly wounded persons. The total of 22,677 represents the combined number of persons wounded and thereafter remains consistent. Further, on 9 November 1992, there is a decline in the number of heavily wounded from 13,605 to 12,000. This sudden decline remains unexplained.

19/ It is not clear exactly what percentage of these casualties involve civilians and non-combatants. However, the following indicates that a high percentage of the city's victims have been civilians: the 2 August and 10 August 1992 Bulletins estimated that 70 per cent of the casualties were civilian; the 19 August 1992 Bulletin estimated that 75 per cent of the casualties were civilian; and the 27 September 1992 Bulletin estimated that 80 per cent of those killed and 75 per cent of the wounded were civilians. Information obtained by the Canadian War Crimes Investigative Team from Dr. Arif Smajkic of the Health Institute indicated that about 85 per cent of the casualties in Sarajevo itself were non-combatants. See Annex VI.A, Sarajevo Investigation.

20/ See Appendix 2, Daily Casualty Totals Reported: Number Killed, for a table containing the daily reports appearing in the chronology where the total number of persons reported killed is documented.

21/ See Appendix 2, Daily Casualty Totals Reported: Number Wounded for a table containing the daily reports appearing in the chronology where the total
The number of persons reported wounded is documented.

22/ The city's residents have attempted to maintain relative normality in the lives of their children. Makeshift elementary schools have been established throughout the city in positions away from snipers and shellfire. These schools move from building to building, partly because the classrooms have been destroyed, but also because groups of children have become targets of shelling attacks. Despite these efforts, the schools are still attacked. For example, on 9 November 1993, a Sarajevo schoolhouse was hit by shellfire, killing at least three children and their teacher, and wounding dozens of others. More recently on 3 January 1994, two shells exploded near a crowd of children as they left a kindergarten, killing at least one and wounding several others.

23/ See Appendix 6, which includes several photographs of the makeshift cemeteries which have appeared throughout the city.

24/ Structural and property damage in this report refers to the infrastructure, as well as to publicly and privately owned property. For a specific treatment of the destruction of utilities, see paragraphs 48-50 below.


27/ See Appendices.

28/ For a comprehensive breakdown of the forces around the city, see Appendix 8, The Structure and Location of the Forces Involved in the Battle and Siege of Sarajevo (Order of Battle).

29/ Reports indicate that Hajrulahovic served as the 1st Corps commander through at least 9 May 1993.


32/ Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, signed at the Hague on 18 October 1907.

Notes (continued)

Conflict, 14 May 1954, 249 UNTS 240 (1956).

34/ UNPROFOR has reported that BiH forces have been scattered in different parts of the city and that they have set up mortars and artillery beside hospitals and schools. The location of military forces and weapons too close to civilian or other protected targets may either justify return fire or provide a basis for "military necessity". However, clearly, this does not apply to intentional attacks upon civilian targets and intentional targeting of civilian targets and sniping against civilians. In addition, there may be questionable situations such as the area near the UN-controlled Sarajevo airport. This area constitutes a corridor between the inner-perimeter defenders and the outer-perimeter defenders. Although neither side is permitted in this enclave, it is, however, used on a regular basis by the defenders to bring supplies and munitions from the inner-perimeter to the outer-perimeter defenders.

35/ See Appendix 2, Total Daily Shelling Activity Reported.

36/ The chronology contains shelling counts provided in available UNPROFOR daily, weekly and monthly reports, as well as in media, wire reports and other sources. UNPROFOR did not officially begin counting shelling activity in Sarajevo until October 1992. Additionally, UNPROFOR reports contain daily shelling counts for only a fraction of the siege.

37/ See Appendix 4, List of Most Frequently Hit Targets with Dates of Shelling Recorded in the IHRLI Chronology of the Battle and Siege of Sarajevo.

38/ Because of the sniping and shelling in the city, journalists at Oslobodjenje are required to remain in the building to work in seven day shifts. According to reports, five of Oslobodjenje's staff have been killed and 20 wounded, including its editor Kemal Kurspahic. But despite near total destruction of its building, restricted electricity and a shortage of paper, the newspaper has been published ever day. For many of Sarajevo's residents, Oslobodjenje has been the only source of information since a lack of power and a shortage of batteries renders radios and televisions useless. See Askold Krushelnycky, "Voice of the People thatRefused to be Killed by War," The European, 9-12 September 1993.

39/ See Appendix 3, Table of Frequency of Shelling in Sarajevo Areas; and Appendix 4, List of Most Frequently Hit Targets With Dates of Shelling.

40/ See Appendix 9.


42/ It is interesting to note that before the siege, Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić served for many years as a clinical psychiatrist at the Košev Hospital.

43/ It has been observed that following infantry attacks by the defensive forces and other efforts to break the siege, the besieging forces have often retaliated with intensive shelling into the city centre causing extensive damage and a high number of casualties. UNPROFOR has observed that the besieging forces have inferior infantry to mount counter-attacks and
therefore use mortar and tank fire to shell the city. This fire is usually
directed towards civilian areas.

44/ The chronology contains reports of sniping attacks by both BSA and
BiH forces.

45/ The siege has proven particularly dangerous to the city's rescue
workers. For example, the Sarajevo Fire Department reported that its casualty
rate was 10 per cent higher than that of the BiH army.

46/ It has been observed that the besieging forces have often increased
their artillery attacks on the city prior to and during the international
peace conferences. See Appendix 2, Sarajevo Shelling and Casualties:
Relationship to Political Events, and the examples below. One explanation for
this increased shelling activity is that the besieging forces are using the
siege as a means to politically pressure the BiH government to agree to peace
terms favorable to the Bosnian Serbs.

47/ It has been observed that the besieging forces have on many
occasions increased shell fire in reaction to statements made by local
political leaders. It has also been observed that the besieging forces seem to
calculate events and the risks that they can take in relation to threats by
third-party governments and organizations. In this regard, when threats by
third-party governments or organizations are not perceived as immediate, the
besieging forces increase or continue their shelling of the city. For example,
Sarajevo was hit with a siege-high 3,777 shells on 22 July 1993 after the US
ruled out direct intervention to prevent the shelling of the city. The
opposite behavior was observed in August 1993, when President Clinton warned
that the US would consider bombing Serbian forces if the shelling of Sarajevo
continued. When this threat appeared immediate, the attacks on Sarajevo
diminished and Serbian troops were withdrawn from the surrounding mountains to
the southwest. Likewise, in reaction to NATO's ultimatum on 9 February 1994
which gave Bosnian Serb forces 10 days to withdraw their heavy weaponry or
face airstrikes, the besieging forces substantially complied and curtailed
their shelling of the city. This behavior by the besieging forces suggests
that there is a centralized command and control of the besieging forces and
that when there is pressure for the shelling to stop, it does.

48/ See also II below (Chronology); Appendix 2, Sarajevo Shelling and
Casualties: Relationship to Political Events.

49/ This shell count does not appear in the statistical data since there
is no report on the total number of shells fired for the day.

50/ See Commission on Human Rights, Situation of Human Rights in the
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, Third periodic report on the situation of
human rights in the territory of the former Yugoslavia submitted by Mr.
Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, UN

51/ It has been estimated by the United Nations that the average adult
in the city has lost approximately twenty-five pounds.

52/ Berlin had received more than two million tons of food and coal on
277,000 flights, while Sarajevo had received 63,000 tons of aid on 5,800
flights.
Notes (continued)

53/ Most recently on 4 May 1994, a German plan carrying UN relief supplies and Germany's new ambassador to BiH was hit by three bullets at the Sarajevo airport. Soon afterward, an Ilyushin-76 plane, flying for the American Soros foundation was hit once by small arms fire. The airlift was suspended thereafter. See Associated Press, "Aid Flights to Sarajevo Suspended, German Ambassador's Plane Hit by Gunfire," Chicago Tribune, 5 May 1994.

54/ See Appendices 3 and 4.

55/ The reports reviewed demonstrate that on occasions, even a single shot fired in the direction of a relief aircraft has suspended the humanitarian airlift. The forces therefore know that any shelling or combat between them in the airport area will inevitably suspend the airlift.

56/ One consequence of cutting down these trees is that the city has become more vulnerable in that snipers and gunners have a better view of their targets.

57/ A UN investigation of the market shelling was inconclusive. A five-member investigative team found that the market blast was caused by a single high-explosive bomb from a conventional, factory made 120 millimetre mortar. The precise location of the weapon that fired the round could not be established. See UN Background Paper, "Sarajevo Market Explosion of 5 February 1994, A Background Summary of UNPROFOR's Investigative Report," 16 February 1994, IHRLI Doc. No. 63707.

58/ According to UNPROFOR reports, a total of 296 heavy BSA weapons were either turned in or were being monitored. A total of 46 BiH weapons were accounted for. See UNPROFOR list of weapons collected in the Sarajevo area, IHRLI Doc. No. 63775.

59/ There are, however, reports as recent as 4 May 1994, that while the two month truce has generally held in the city, UNPROFOR has noted a recent increase in violations of the NATO ultimatum. A UN spokesman, Major Dacre Holloway, said that at least two or three explosions heard in the city on 4 May, were probably tank cannons. Holloway also said that a BSA tank was spotted earlier in the day in Krupac, just south of BSA-held Lukavica. Both suburbs are inside the arms exclusion zone. See Associated Press, "Aid Flights to Sarajevo Suspended, German Ambassador's Plane Hit by Gunfire," Chicago Tribune, 5 May 1994.


61/ Id.

62/ Id.


64/ Id.

Notes (continued)

66/ Id.


81/ Id.


83/ Id.
Notes (continued)


85/ Id.

86/ Id.

87/ Id.


93/ Id.


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102/ Id.

103/ Nikola Antonov, "Fighting Eases in Bosnia Ahead of UN Visit", 

104/ Jonathan S. Landay, "Yugoslav Army Pushes from Serbia into Bosnia-
Hercegovina", United Press International, 14 April 1992, IHRLI Sarajevo Source 

105/ Gordana Kukic, "Tens of Thousands of Refugees Flee Bosnian 

106/ Carnegie Endowment, Breakdown in the Balkans, a Chronicle of 

107/ Chuck Sudetic, "Vance Appeals to Serbs to Halt Bosnia Fighting", 

108/ Sid Balman Jr., "US Proposes Tough Steps Against Yugoslavia", 
United Press International, 15 April 1992, IHRLI Sarajevo Source File, April 
027274.

109/ Nesho Djuric, "Vance: No Peacekeeping Troops for Bosnia", United 

110/ Chuck Sudetic, "Breaking Cease-Fire, Serbs Launch Attacks Into 
Bosnia", New York Times, 15 April 1992, IHRLI Sarajevo Source File, April 

111/ Meriel Beattie, "UN Envoy Urges Bosnia's Rival Groups to Keep 

112/ Nikola Antonov, "Shaky Bosnian Cease-Fire Enters the Third Day", 

113/ Blaine Harden, "Serbia Unmoved by Western Warnings: Belgrade 
Presses Offensive in Bosnia", Washington Post, 17 April 1992, IHRLI Sarajevo 

114/ Nikola Antonov, "UN Envoy Vance Optimistic For Peace in Bosnia", 

115/ Id.; Meriel Beattie, "Gunbattles Rock Bosnian Capital After UN 

116/ Chuck Sudetic, "Intense Fighting in Sarajevo Threatens US Aid 
Flights", New York Times, 18 April 1992, IHRLI Sarajevo Source File, April 

117/ Id.

118/ Andrej Gustincic, "UN Envoy Fears Disaster in Bosnia", Reuters, 17 
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138/ Id.

139/ Id.

140/ Id.

141/ Id.

142/ Id.

143/ Id.

144/ Id.


153/ Id.

154/ Id.

155/ Id.

156/ Id.

157/ Id.

158/ Id.
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160/ Id.


175/ "New Barrage Against Sarajevo, Unexploded Shells a Threat", United


177/ "Lisbon Delegations Support UN Troop Arrival", Belgrade Tanjug Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian, 29 April 1993, 1007 GMT, FBIS LD2904133592.


192/ Id.

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200/ Id.


202/ Id.


204/ Id.


212/ Id.

213/ Hugh Pain, "UN Envoy Says No Agreement on Peace Force for Bosnia",
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214/  Id.


226/  Id.


228/  Id.


231/  Id.
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239/ See Materials submitted by the government of BiH, IHRLI Doc. No. 027274.


242/ Id.


244/ Id.

245/ Id.

246/ Id.

247/ Id.

248/ Id.

249/ Id.


254/ Id.


259/ Incid. No. 18017, Source: Helsinki Watch.


265/ Id.


268/ Id.


272/ "Muslim, Croat Officials Agree to `Confederation'", Belgrade Tanjug in English, 19 May 1992, 1137 GMT, FBIS #LD1905180192.
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281/ Id.

282/ Id.


285/ Id.


287/ Id.


289/ Id.


293/ Donald Forbes, "Arms Row Traps Yugoslav Soldiers in Sarajevo", 
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294/ Id.

295/ Id.


300/ Id.

301/ Id.

302/ Incid. No. 10220, Source: Save the Humanity.

303/ Incid. No. 12030, Source: Save the Humanity.


310/ Id.


314/ Id.
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325/ Id.


327/ Id.


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340/ Id.


347/ Id.

348/ Id.

349/ Id.

350/ Id.

Notes (continued)


352/ Id.

353/ Id.


357/ Id.


369/ "UNPROFOR Chief Departs for Sarajevo", Belgrade Tanjug in English, 10 June 1992, 1538 GMT, FBIS #LD1006163592.
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371/ Id.


374/ Id.


382/ Id.


384/ Id.


386/ Id.

387/ Incid. No. 38367, Source: ISHR British Section.

388/ Incid. No. 18024, Source: UPI.

389/ Blaine Harden, "Bosnian Leader Declares Alliance With Croatia: Military Pact Aims to Counter Sweep By Serb Forces", 17 June 1992, IHRLI
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393/ Id.


398/ Id.


402/ Incid No. 10115, Source: Helsinki Watch.


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421/ Id.


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428/ Id.


432/ Id.


434/ Id.


443/ Id.
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445/ Id.


447/ Id.


461/ Id.

462/ Blaine Harden, "In Bosnia Not All Victims Are People", Washington
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469/ Id.


480/ Id.

481/ Id.
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482/ Id.


486/ Id.


499/ Id.

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505/ Id.

506/ Id.


510/ Id.


518/ Hugh Pain, "Serbs Attack East Bosnian Town in New Flare-Up",.
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524/ Id.


526/ Id.

527/ Id.


529/ Id.


534/ Id.


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544/ Id.

545/ Incid. No. 86, Source: U.S. Submission


550/ Id.


555/ Id.

556/ Id.


559/ Hugh Pain, "Serbs Attack in Bosnia Despite Cease-Fire Offer",
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560/  "A Young Boy . . . Just Another Sniper Victim", Agence France

561/  Carnegie Endowment, Breakdown in the Balkans, A Chronicle of

562/  Craig R. Whitney, "Bosnia, Where Titans Fear to Tread", New York

563/  Id.

564/  Hugh Pain, "Cease-Fire Order Fails to Halt Gora de Battle", 

565/  "Bosnia Talks Into Third Day With Barely a Glimmer of a
Breakthrough", Agence France Presse, 17 July 1992, IHRLI Sarajevo Source File,

566/  "Food and Morale in Bosnia", 16 July 1992, Sarajevo Source File,

567/  Carnegie Endowment, Breakdown in the Balkans, A Chronicle of

568/  "Bosnia Talks Continue Amid General Pessimism", Agence France

569/  Sue Backer, "Shell Blasts Sarajevo as Hurd Meets Bosnian Leader", 

570/  Hugh Pain, " Cease-Fire Talk Fails To Quell Yugoslav Fighting", 

571/  Glenn Frankel, "Factions Agree on Cease Fire", Washington Post, 18 

572/  John F. Burns, "British Warns Sarajevo Over Any Military Help", New 

573/  Id.; Craig R. Whitney, "Factions in Bosnia Accept U.N. Custody of 
Glenn Frankel "Factions Agree on Cease Fire", Washington Post, 18 July 1992, 

574/  Patrick E. Tyler, "U.N. Chief's Dispute with Council Boils Over", 

575/  John F. Burns, "British Warns Sarajevo Over Any Military Help", New 
"U.S. is Shying Away from Bosnia Conflict", New York Times, 19 July 1992, 

576/  "Sarajevo Gunfire Falls Silent 24 Hours Before Ceasefire Deadline", 
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608/ Id.


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615/ Id.


618/ Id.


620/ Id.


628/ Id.


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634/ Id.

635/ Id.


644/ Id.


649/ Nikola Gurovic, "Largest Humanitarian Aid Convoy in Sarajevo",
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650/ Id.
651/ Id.
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667/ "Five U.N. Peacekeepers Wounded in Sarajevo--Airport Reopens", "
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670/ Id.

671/ Id.

672/ Id.


680/ Id.


683/ Id.

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690/ Id.

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698/ Id.

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701/ Id.


706/ Id.

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714/ Id.

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744/ Id.


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751/  Id.
752/  Id.
764/  Id.
765/  Id.
768/  Kurt Schork, "Fresh Evacuation Planned Amid Fighting", Reuters, 15
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783/ Id.


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796/ Id.

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806/ "Sarajevo Airport Reopens After Two-Day Closure As Fighting
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808/ Id.
809/ Id.

812/ Id.

821/ Id.
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828/ Id.
834/ Id.
836/ Id.
837/ Id.
839/ "38 Dead In Recent Bombardment Of Sarajevo As Conference Approaches", Agence France Presse, 23 August 1992, IHRLI Sarajevo Source File, August 1992.
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845/ Id.
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859/ Id.


862/ Id.


864/ Id.

865/ Id.


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871/ Id.

872/ Id.


879/ Id.


882/ Id.


885/ Id.


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890/ Id.


896/ Id.


900/ Id.

901/ Id.


905/ Id.


908/ Id.
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913/ Id.

914/ Id.

915/ Id.


918/ Id.


920/ Id.


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934/ Id.


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942/ Id.


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948/ Id.; "Fierce Fighting Leaves At Least Eight Dead In Sarajevo", Agence France Presse, 1 September 1992, IHRLI Sarajevo Source File, September 1992.

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965/ Id.

966/ Id.
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981/ See IHRLI, Chronology of the Negotiations for Peace in the Former Yugoslavia.
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983/  Incident No. 42, Source: US Submission


990/  Id.

991/  Id.


993/  Id.


996/  Id.


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1004/ "Yugoslav Conference Participants Resign", Belgrade Borba in Serbo-Croatian, 7 September 1993, at 6, FBIS #92BA1424B.


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1018/ "Tudjman `Pleased' With Stands of Vance, Owen", Zagreb Radio
Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian, 9 September 1992, 2000 GMT, FBIS
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1019/ See IHRLI, Chronology of the Negotiations for Peace in the Former
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1020/ "Peace Envoy Head For Sarajevo, Fighting Reported", Reuters, 10

1021/ Jonathan S. Landay, "Warring Factions Agree To Attend Yugoslav

1022/ Id.

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1024/ "Vance, Owen Arrive In Sarajevo, Meet With Izetbegovic", Agence

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1027/ Evelyn Leopold, "UN Chief to Recommend Enlarged Bosnia Force
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1030/ Blaine Harden, "Sarajevo's Multi-Ethnic Elite Gather In Act of
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1031/ Jonathan Landay, "Shelling Of Civilians Continues Despite
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1038/ Id.


1042/ Id.

1043/ Id.


1046/ Id.

1047/ Id.


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1063/ Id.


1068/ "Heavy Exchanges Of Fire Shatter Sarajevo Lull", Reuters, 14 September 1992, IHRLI Sarajevo Source File, September 1992; "Intense Fighting
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1080/ Id.


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1122/ Richard Balmforth, "Yugoslav Drama's Key Players Head for UN", Reuters, 21 September 1992, IHRLI Sarajevo Source File, September 1992;
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1155/ Id.

1156/ Id.

1157/ Id.
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1159/ Id.

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1163/ See IHRLI, Chronology of the Negotiations for Peace in the Former Yugoslavia.


1165/ Incid. No. 86, United States Submission


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1207/ "Izetbegovic Agrees to Demilitarization Talks", Belgrade Tanjug in English, 29 September 1993, 1623 GMT, FBIS #LD2909172392.


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1214/ Id.

1215/ See IHRLI, Chronology of the Negotiations for Peace in the Former Yugoslavia.

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1218/ Id.


1225/ Id.

1226/ Id.


1232/ Id.


Notes (continued)


1239/ Id.


1245/ Id.

1246/ Id.

1247/ Id.

1248/ Id.

1249/ Id.

1250/ Id.


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1255/  Id.
1257/  See IHRLI, Chronology of the Negotiations for Peace in the Former Yugoslavia.
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1293/ Carnegie Endowment, Breakdown in the Balkans, A Chronicle of
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1309/ See IHRLI, Chronology of the Negotiations for Peace in the Former
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1311/ Id.

1312/ Id.


1315/ Id.

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1318/ Id.


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1324/ IHRLI, Chronology of the Negotiations for Peace in the Former Yugoslavia.


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1339/ IHRLI, Chronology of the Negotiations for Peace in the Former Yugoslavia.


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1343/ Id.


1347/ Kurt Schork, "Rival Military Officers Meet in Sarajevo for the
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1349/ IHRLI, Chronology of the Negotiations for Peace in the Former Yugoslavia.


1351/ Id.


1361/ Id.


1364/ IHRLI, Chronology of the Negotiations for Peace in the Former Yugoslavia.
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1367/ Id.


1370/ Id.

1371/ IHRLI, Chronology of the Negotiations for Peace in the Former Yugoslavia.


1374/ Id.


